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Abs t rac t 
We examine the effect of a rent subsidy program, Rent Assistance, on the demand 
for rental housing in The Netherlands. Low-income households with a rent that 
exceeds a norm rent, but is smaller than a maximum rent are eligible for this 
subsidy, that is equal to a fraction of the difference between the rent and the norm 
rent. The RA program lowers the marginal price of housing services, but in order to 
get this price reduction households have to pay an implicit entry fee. To estimate 
the effect of the program we develop a structural model of housing demand. This 
model takes account of the partial take-up of the subsidy. We estimate a reduced 
form that is compatible with the structural model and we test the restrictions that 
the structural model imposes on the reduced form. We find that if we allow for 
application costs the structural restrictions are not rejected by the data. We use the 
model to decompose the observed difference in housing demand into income-, price 
and preference heterogeneity effects, to examine the effect of application costs and 
to study the total effect of RA on housing demand. 

1 Introduction 
In most developed nations the government intervenes in the housing market, and 
The Netherlands is no exception (see e.g. Ball, Harloe and Maartens (1988)). Some 
of the policies pursued by the Dutch government stimulate the supply of (low-cost) 
housing, e.g. subsidies for the construction of housing for low-income households. 
Other policies stimulate the demand for housing, e.g. (full) deductibility of interest 
payments on mortgages for owner-occupiers and direct rent-subsidies for low-income 
reuters. In this paper, we study the effect of direct rent subsidies on housing demand. 
The rent subsidy program in The Netherlands is called Individuele Huursub-
sidie (IHS) which we shall translate as Rent Assistance (RA)* In the program 
year 1985/861 777 thousand households received RA, that is 25% of all renting 
households2. They received Dfl. 1344 million (approximately TJ$ 675 million) in RA 
subsidies, i.e. Dfl 1729 per household that is 33% of the average rent paid by an RA 
recipiënt. The RA program was introduced in 1970 in order to bring good quality 
housing within reach of low-income households. It was feit that the consumption 
of housing services should be subsidized, because housing was considered to he a 
merit good having external effects on the health and ability to work of household 
members. Moreover, under the assumption that rents can be controlled—and in-
deed in The Netherlands price controls on the rental market are pervasive—the RA 
program increased the real income of eligible households. Although there is little 
discussion of the goal of the RA-program, it seems that recently the merit good 
argument has lost ground to distributional considerations3. 
The RA program affects the relative price of housing services for eligible house-
holds in a rather complicated way. The resulting budget set, when choice is restricted 
to housing services and other consumption, is non-convex. In this paper we propose 
a utility maximizing model of housing demand, that takes account of the budget 
constraint as implied by RA. In specifying this model, we can draw on the exten-
sive experience of applied econometricians with demand analysis in the presence of 
non-linear budget sets (see e.g. Pudney (1989) for an introduction). An additional 
complication is that about 40% of households that are eligible for RA do not apply 
for the subsidy. For that reason, we shal 1 specify a joint model of RA take-up and 
housing demand. 
By making a distinction between household preferences and constraints, includ-
ing the perceived costs of application for RA, we hope to isolate the parameters 
of the preference structure. K we succeed, we can simulate the effect of changes in 
the RA program. A structural model is better suited to policy analysis, because 
its parameters are invariant under policy changes. In particular, we can investigate 
whether RA achieves its stated goals. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the rules of the RA 
program. The data are discussed in section 3. Section 4 introduces a structural 
model for housing demand. This model is estimated in section 5, and section 6 
contains some implications of the estimates. In section 7 we summarize the results. 
1 The program yeax for RA runs from July 1 to June 30. The year 1985/6 started on July 1, 
1985 and ended on June 30,1986. All our data pertain to this year. 
2 In 1985/86 56% of all households were reuters. 
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 The policy intentions of the Dutch government are summarized in Volkshuisvesting in de 
jaren negentig (Housing in the Nineties). 
1 
2 The Rent Assistance Program and Rental 
Housing Supply 
2.1 The Rent Assistance Program 
The eligibility for RA and the amount of the subsidy are determined by three 
parameters: household income, household composition and rent4. We refer to the 
relevant measure of rent paid as the RA rent. The RA rent includes some service 
charges, such as charges for heating and cleaning of communal space in an apartment 
building (but not of the apartments), but it excludes charges for cleaning windows 
or the rent of a garage that sometimes are paid with the rent. 
A household is eligible for RA if the RA rent exceeds the norm rent, but is lower 
than the maximum rent. The norm rent is the rent that the household is supposed 
to be able to pay, given its composition and income. It depends on household tax-
able income in the calendar year preceding the program year5, and on household 
composition. Household taxable income is the sum of the taxable incomes of the 
household members. The norm rent increases with household taxable income, but 
decreases with family size. The only distinction made in household composition is 
between households having one member and households having two or more mem-
bers. To be eligible for RA in the program year 1985/6 taxable income in 1984 had 
to be less than Dn. 35000 for households with two or more members or Dfl. 31000 
for households with only one member6. The maximum rent in 1985/6 was equal 
to Dfl. 8040 per year for households with two or more members and Dfl. 6360 for 
households with one member. The household received no RA, if the RA rent ex-
ceeded the maximum rent. A household did also not qualify for RA, if its RA rent 
was less than Dfl. 2960 per year. This is the lower bound on the norm rent7. 
The amount of the subsidy is determined by the difference between the RA rent 
and the norm rent. The computation is illustrated in figure 1. The numbers refer to 
a household with two or more members. The computation is similar for households 
with one member. The lower boundary of the region in figure 1 is the norm rent8. 
The lowest norm rent is Dfl. 2780 per year and the highest norm rent is Dfl. 7540 per 
year.The norm rent is a step function of taxable household income. It is constant 
on intervals of width Dfl. 500 (taxable household income less than Dfl. 28000) or 
Dfl. 1000 (taxable household income between Dfl. 28000 and Dfl. 35000). The regions 
A to E correspond to different subsidy rates. In region A, the subsidy rate is 100%, 
in region B 90%, and in regions C, D and E it is 80%, 70% and 60% respectively. 
The subsidy rates are applied to the difference between the RA rent and the norm 
rent that is in the relevant region. Consider e.g. a household with a taxable income 
of Dfl. 27250 and an RA rent of Dfl. 7000. The norm rent for this household is 
Dfl. 4600, so that the RA computation is based on the difference, Dfl. 2400. This 
difference is in the regions B, C and D, Dfl. 760 in B, 1200 in C and 440 in D. 
Hence, the subsidy is equal to 0.90 x 760 + 0.80 x 1200 + 0.70 x 440 = Dfl. 1952. 
The subsidy is rounded to a smaller integer multiple of Dfl. 60, so that the subsidy 
is Dfl. 1920, 27% of the RA rent. 
Erom figure 1 it is clear that the marginal price of housing services is not con-
4
 The administration of the RA program is in the hands of the municipalities (in Dutch: ge-
meenten). 
5If taxable income is expected to change by more than 25% in the program year, an estimate 
of taxable income is used to compute the RA entitlement. 
6
 A household is not eligible for RA, irrespective of its income, if the valne of its assets exceeds 
Dfl. 107000. 
7To b e precise, the lower bound on the norm rent in 1985/6 was Dfl. 2780, but RA was only 
paid if the subsidy exceeded Dfl. 180 per year. 
8 In figure 1 the relation between household taxable income and norm rent is somewhat 
simplified. 
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Figure 1: Determination of RA 
stant. Depending on household taxable income and the RA rent a household pays 
0% (if the RA rent is in region A) to 100% (if the RA rent is not in the regions A 
to E) of an additional guilder spent on housing. 
Note that the dependence of the norm rent on taxable income also increases 
the income tax rate, in particular for low-income families. Hence, the RA program 
could have an effect on the work effort. In general, RA is a non-negligible part of 
disposable income. In the data used in this paper, the average fraction of household 
disposable income derived from RA is 10% for RA recipients. For families in the 
first quartile of the income distribution, this fraction is 13%. 
2.2 Rental Housing Supply 
The most important suppliers of rental housing are housing corporations (Dutch: 
woningbouwvereniging) and real-estate agents. The allocation of rental housing with 
rents below the rent limit (Dutch: huurgrens) 9 is regulated by the municipalities. 
Households that are searching for a rental dwelling below the rent limit may regis-
ter with the municipalities and state their preferences concerning rent, size of the 
dweiling, district, etc. As soon as a suitable dweiling is available, this is offered to 
the household. The household then either accepts the dwelling or waits for another 
offer. Households can also search themselves, and indeed many dwellings are found 
that way. However, they still need approval of the local authorities to move in. Al-
though this allocation system puts some restrictions on the choices of households, 
we assume that on average potential RA recipients are able to satisfy their demand 
for housing services at the given unit price. 
Almost all rental housing below the rent limit is owned by housing corporations. 
The rents are determined by rules (prescribed by the government) which take into 
account size and other amenities of the dwelling, year of construction and building 
9Rent limits ore determined by municipalities and are higher than the maximum rent. 
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costs10. Because of these rules, it is not possibie for letters to charge higher rents 
to households that receive EA in order to benefit from the program. 
Since our empirical analysis is based on a cross-section survey, we abstract from 
intertemporal considerations in housing demand and supply. In the segment of the 
rental market where demand is affected by RA, govemment policy aims at satisfy-
ing demand at a unit price that the govemment considers to be reasonable. As a 
consequence our assumption that the observed distribution of rents is closely related 
to the distribution of quantities demanded is reasonable. 
3 A Model of Housing Demand with Rent 
Assistance 
3.1 Household Utility Maximization 
In this section we propose a model of housing demand in the presence of RA. We 
assume that the household is the decision making unit, and that its preferences can 
be described by a single utility function. The household divides its income between 
housing services and other consumption. The price of a unit of housing services 
is the same for all dwellings, and without loss of generality we set it to Dfl. I1 1 . 
Hence, the rent equals the quantity of housing services provided by the dweiling. 
We assume that the household maximizes its utility function subject to a budget 
constraint that is affected by the RA program. We also must take account of the 
partial take-up of RA benefits. First, we discuss the budget constraint. Next, we 
specify household preferences and we consider the household maximization problem. 
Finally, we propose a model for the take-up of RA. 
3 . 2 T h e B u d g e t C o n s t r a i n t w i t h R A 
The budget constraint of the household is 
R + X = Y + S, (1) 
where R denotes the rent, X the consumption of other goods, Y is disposable income 
and S is the RA subsidy, which may be 0. For R we shall use the RA rent. 
S is detennined by the difference between the RA rent R and the norm rent 
Rn(YT,H) that depends on household taxable income YT and household composi-
tion H. Although the subsidy rate 6 depends on R— Rn(YT,H) (see figure 1), we 
apply a constant subsidy rate to the difference. We set 6 = 0.823, which is the aver-
age rate for RA recipients in our sample. Using this simpliiication, we can compute 
the RA subsidy by 
={i (R-Rn(YT,H)) Rn(YT,H)<R<Rmax(H), ( ) R < Rn(YT, H)oiR> Rmax{H), ^ 
where Rmax(H) is the maximum rent, that depends on the household composition. 
Substitution of equation (2) in equation (1) and some rewriting gives the budget 
constraint 
R + X = Y R<Rn(YT,H)oxR>Rmax(H) 
(1-S)R + X = Y- SRn(YT, H) Rn(YT, H)<R< Rmax{H) " W 
These rules are referred to as the point system (Dutch: puntenstelsel). 
1 1
 As pointed out before the purpose of the Tent guidelines of the Dutch govemment is to xeduce 
dispetsion of unit prices. Moreover, if the household faces unit price dispersion it may use the 
expectedunit price to detennine its demand for housing services. 
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Figure 2: Budget set of RA recipiënt 
If we set Rn = Rmax for households that do not qualify for RA because their taxable 
income is too high, then equation (3) applies to all households in the population. 
Equation (3) makes clear that RA has two effects on the budget constraint. First, 
it reduces the (marginal) price of housing services from 1 to 1 — 6. Second, it has 
a negative effect on disposable income. To be eligible for RA the household must 
consume an amount of housing services that exceeds the norm rent. A fraction l — S 
of Rn has to be paid anyway, but the amount 6Rn is the household contribution to 
the 'entry fee' for RA. In other words, 6Rn can be considered as a fixed cost, which 
has to be incurred in order to be eligible for RA. Following e.g. Blomquist (1983) 
we define virtual income Yv by 
Yv=Y-SRn(YT,H). (4) 
Hence we can rewrite the second line in equation (3) as 
(1-6)R + X = YV Rn(YT,H)<R<Rmax(H). (5) 
The fixed cost is on average Dn. 2735 per year which equals 14% of average dispos-
able household income. 
The budget constraint of an RA recipiënt is drawn in figure 2. It is evident that 
the budget set of an RA recipiënt is non-convex. The slope of the segments YA and 
A"Y' is 1, while the slope of the segment AA' is 1 — 6, reflecting the lower marginal 
price of housing services under RA. 
From figure 2 we see that households that would choose an (R, X) combination 
on the segment AA" in the absence of RA move to AA' after introduction of RA. 
Moreover, some households that give housing low priority move from YA to AA' 
and some households with strong relative preferences for housing services move from 
A"Y' to AA'. Without knowledge of the preferences of the household we can not 
make more precise predictions. 
5 
\ 
\ 
X 
Rn Rmax Y' R Rmax R 
A B 
Figure 3: Decomposition of the nou-convex budget set in two convex budget sets 
3.3 Preferences and Utility Maximization 
We assume that household preferences can be represented by the utility function 
If we maximize (6) subject to a linear budget constraint 
pR + X = Y, 
we obtain the indirect utility function 
Kp, Y) = (Y + | p + g- + &) exp(-/?1p)I 
and the demand for housing services 
i ï = /?0 + /? 1 y+/? 2 p. 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
We are somewhat restricted in our choice of preference structure, because we need 
an explicit expression for the indirect utility function. 
According to the Slutsky condition, the parameters of demand equation (9) have 
to satisfy the following restriction: 
« . a + « = A a + A s t (10) 
If the parameters do not satisfy this restriction, then the solution (9) does not satisfy 
the second-order conditions for the maximization of utility function (6) subject to 
budget constraint (7). 
The budget set in figure 2 is non-convex. In figure 3 we decompose this budget set 
in two convex sets whose union is the original non-convex budget set. We consider 
utility maximization subject to the budget constraints A and B separately. The 
optimal choice with budget constraint A, which is the constraint faced by households 
that are not eligible for RA, is denoted by (RA, XA). The optimal choice with budget 
set B is (RB,XB). The utility maximizing (R,X) isfoundby comj>axïa.g u(RA,XA) 
&ndu{RB,XB). 
Note that this solution method requires knowledge of the direct utility func-
tion u(R, X). A solution method that only requires the indirect utility function is 
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pieferable, because by Roy's identity we can obtain the demandfor housing services 
directly from the indirect utility function. Hence, expressing the decision to apply 
for RA in terms of the indirect utility function gives us additional flexibility in the 
selection of functional forms, because an explicit solutionfor the direct utility func-
tion is not required. If we ignore the constraint R < Rmax(H) in figure 3B, i.e. if 
we assume that the preferences are such that optimal choice under RA is always on 
the interior of YVA', then an eligible household will choose a dweiling with RA if 
and only if 
v{l-6,Yv)>v(l,Y). (11) 
In section 4 we shall see that there is no indication that the constraint R = Rmas 
is binding for a positive fraction of the households in our sample. 
If we ignore the constraint R < Rmax, the indirect utility function in (8) leads 
to the following demand equations (here and in the sequel RA and RB refer to 
unrestricted choices): 
ff_ ÏRA=PO+P2+PIY i fno tRA, 
K
- \ R B = pQ + l32(l-6) + p1Yv ifRA, ^ 
with according to equation (11) 
RA <s> I* = i/(l - 6, Yv) - v(l, Y) > 0, (13) 
where 
r-fêo-o+|+£)-»<-Aa-TO-(£+|+!)«*-tt 
+ r „ e x p H J 1 ( l - « ) ) - y e x p ( - f t ) . (14) 
If we acknowledge the constraint R < Rmax in the RA regime, then there are three 
instead of two regimes and we obtain 
(0O+ & + &?, r<o, 
R = ! fa + /?2(1 - 8) + ^Yv, r >0,RB< Rmax, (15) 
l Rmax> ï* ^ °) RB > Rmax' 
with RB =/?0-(- /32(1 — S)+ 0-^Xv *fie optimal choice in the RA regime if we ignore 
the inequality constraint. Hence, if we ignore the households with RB > Rmax we 
obtain 
- { fa + fa+^Y, r<o, fa + fa{l-S) + pxYv, I*>0,RB<Rmax, W 
The household does not receive RA if the optimal choice lies on either one of the 
segments YA or A"Y' in figure 2. In the empirical analysis we ignore the observations 
corresponding to A"Y' (see also section 4.1). This amounts to the imposition of an 
inequality constraint in the non-RA regime. Hence, if RA = /?0 + fix + p2Y is the 
optimal choice in the non-RA regime, then the iull demand equation is (we ignore 
the households with RB > Rmac)'-
R-f&A = h+p2 + PiY, I*<0,RA<Rmax 
" - \ R B = 0o + l32{l-6) + p1Yv, r>Q,RB<RmaT, {U) 
Whether the additionalrestnctions on RA and RB complicate the empirical analysis 
depends on the stochastic specification of the econometrie model. If we add distur-
bances to the demand equation, we obtain a switching regression Tobit model. 
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Figure 4: The consequences of application costs 
3.4 Modelling the Take-up of RA 
It is well known, that the take-up of income-support programs is in general less 
than 100%, see for instance Blundell, Fry and Walker (1988) and Moffit (1983). 
For the RA program, this fact has also been documented. Estimates of the take-up 
rate for RA vary from 44% to 76% (Konings and Van Oorschot (1990)). We shall 
incorporate a take-up decision in model (12)-(14). 
One eau think of at least two reasons why households do not apply for RA, even 
though they are entitled to benefits. First of all, the household may be unaware of 
its entitlement. As seen in section 2, the program is rather complex, and it is not 
immediately clear if a household is entitled to an RA subsidy, given its income and 
rent. The second reason for not using the program, is the existence of application 
costs. These costs can be monetary (one has to make xeroxes, fill in forms, read 
information, etc.) and non-monetary (stigma associated with using a government 
income-support program, cf Moffit (1983)). 
Our empirical results show that the take-up is related to the amount of benefit 
that one would obtain under RA. This is consistent with the presence of application 
costs, and hence we model the take-up by introducing such costs. 
Let the costs be denoted by C. Household income under RA is now Yv — C, with 
indirect utility v(l — 8,YV — C). Hence, a household will choose a dweiling with RA, 
if v(l — S,YV — C) > v(l,Y). In this approach we can also take account of non-
monetary indirect utility costs. Suppose these non-monetary costs are v (measured 
in utils). Then, the household will choose a rent with RA, if 
v{l-8,Yv-C)-V{l,Y)>ü, 
which with specification (8) can be rewritten as 
v{l - 8,YV) - v(l,Y) > Cexp(-^(1 - 8)) + v. (18) 
If we redefine the costs incurred as C' = C + ï>/exp(—/?x(l — 8)), one sees that a 
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household will choose a rent with RA if 
v(l-6,Yv-C)-vQ.,Y)>0. (19) 
The non-monetary costs v are valued at the marginal utility of income. In the 
present model, monetary and non-monetary application costs reduce virtual income 
Yv under RA. 
The effect of application costs on the budget constraint is illustrated in figure 4. 
The budget constraint with application costs is YABB'A"Y'. The effect of RA on 
househoids with rents on AA" is different with and without application costs. In 
both cases househoids on B"A" will apply for RA. However, if C — 0 all househoids 
on AB" will apply, but whether a household on AB" will apply if C > 0 depends on 
its relative preference for housing services. Househoids with low relative preferences 
will choose not to apply. Hence, if there are application costs then application for 
RA is positively related to the amount of the entitlement. 
4 The Data 
4.1 Description of the Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The empirical analysis used data from the Housing Needs Survey 1985/86 (to be 
abbreviated as HNS 85/6). This survey is based on a laige sample from the Dutch 
population (54342 responding househoids, with the sample size being 70816). The 
sample and the sample design are described in detail in CBS (1990). For our pur-
poses, we can consider the sample as a random sample of househoids. The survey 
contains detailed information on the dweiling of the househoids, as well as on their 
socio-economic characteristics. 
We do not use all sample househoids in the analysis. We restrict ourselves to 
renters who satisfy certain criteria. These criteria are listed in Appendix A. Most 
selections are made to ensure that the utility-maximizing model is a reasonable 
description of household behaviour. We retain only househoids of which either the 
head of the household or his/her partner are interviewed. Moreover, we only consider 
househoids with a taxable income that entitles them to RA. Whether a potential 
RA recipiënt actually receives RA is another matter. 
There are three reasons why a potential RA recipiënt does not receive RA: the 
rent paid is smaller than the norm rent, the rent paid is higher than the maximum 
rent or the household is eligible for RA, but it does not apply for the subsidy. In 
the sample we find that very few househoids do not receive RA because their rent 
exceeds the maximum rent. Moreover, there is no indication that househoids in the 
RA regime are constrained by the restriction that the rent should not exceed the 
maximum rent. If this were the case, we would observe a clustering of observed rents 
at and slightly below the maximum rent, which we do not. For these reasons, we 
select only those househoids whose rent is below the maximum rent and for these 
househoids we neglect the constraint that the rent should not exceed the maximum 
rent. This selection facilitates the empirical analysis. 
We want to include only househoids that are utility maximizers. A Standard 
approach in the literature is to select househoids that have moved recently (see, e.g. 
Ball and Kirwan (1977)). Househoids that moved a long time ago may no longer be 
in equilibrium, because adjustment costs may prevent them from moving to another 
dweiling. By retaining only those househoids that have moved recently, we hope that 
the observed consumption of housing services is close to the utility maximizing level 
of consumption. Of course, we could use all househoids, but then we would need 
to model the effect of adjustment costs on housing consumption explicitly. Our 
approach circumvents this problem. 
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Variable Full sample BA-recipients RA-recipients 
Income (Y) 22.93 20.83 24.28 
(6.00) (5.32) (6.03) 
Virtual Income (Yv) 19.48 18.02 20.42 
(5.07) (4.78) (5.03) 
Rent (R) 4.84 5.62 4.34 
(1.52) (1.23) (1.48) 
Norm rent (Rn) 4.12 3.36 4.61 
(1.47) (0.90) (1.56) 
Rent assistance (5) 1.08 2.01 0.48 
(1.20) (1.05) (0.86) 
Entitled to RA 61.4% 100% 36.5% 
Price (p) 0.68 0.18 1.00 
Size 2.35 2.40 2.32 
(1.31) (1.28) (1.32) 
Age 43.72 45.73 42.42 
(18.75) (19.50) (18.14) 
Observations 1809 710 1099 
Table 1: Means of variables, Standard deviations in parentheses 
We use some additional information to identify utility-maximizing households. 
In the HNS 85/6, households were asked if they intended to move within two years 
and whether they were satisfied with their dwelling and neighbourhood. We select 
those households which claimed to have no intentions of moving within two years 
and which were reasonably happy with their dwelling and neighbourhood. Even 
though this selection is based on intentions and not on observed behaviour, we 
think that it improves the correspondence between the data and the model. 
A problem in analyzing housing demand is that we only observe housing expen-
ditures. Housing expenditures are the product of the unit price of housing services 
and the quantity of housing services. However, price and quantity are not observed 
separately. For that reason we assume that the unit price of housing services is the 
same for all rental dwellings. In other words, differences in rents reflect differences 
in the quantity of housing services rather than differences in the price of housing 
services. We normaiize the price component to 1. Every other normalization would 
do, because it merely changes the units of measurement of the quantity of housing 
services. Hence, the only price variation we allow for is the price variation due to 
the RA program. 
For each household in the sample we computed its RA entitlement using infor-
mation on household taxable income and family composition. The income measure 
needed for the calculation of the RA benefit in the year July 1 1985 - June 30 1986 
is taxable household income in 1984. However, taxable income in the HNS 85/6 
is measured over the year 1985. We assumed that taxable wage income increased 
by 2% from 1984 to 198512, and we assumed that social security benefits remained 
constant. This enabled us to estimate taxable household income in 1984. 
We present some summary statistics in table 1. All variables have been intro-
duced before, except SIZE and AGE. SIZE is the size of the household and AGE 
is the age of the head of the household. All monetary variables are measured in 
thousands of guilders. The variable Rent assistance in table 1 is the computed RA 
subsidy, i.e. the outcome of our computation of the RA benefits. The household 
may or may not take up these benefits. 
1 2
 See Central Planning Bureau (1986), table IV.8. 
10 
Note that BA recipients spend, on average, more on housing than non-recipients. 
This may be due to the lower price of housing in the RA regime, but it may also 
be a consequence of the threshold, i.e. the norm rent, in the RA program. We also 
see that the fixed cost of entering the program (the difFerence between Y and Yv, 
see section 3.2) is higher for non-recipients than for recipients. The differences in 
household size and age between the two groups are small. 
Note that the average computed RA subsidy is not zero for households who 
do not receive RA. This means that there are households who are entitled to an 
RA benefit, but who do not receive the benefit. In fact, in our sample the take-up 
is 63.9%. The partial take-up of RA benefits will receive explicit attention in our 
empirical model. 
4.2 A Preliminary Analysis 
From table 1 we can obtain crude estimates of the price and income elasticity of 
housmg demand. We estimate the price elasticity by 
= (ff-È-yR = -0.22, (20) 
p
 (PB~PA)/P 
where RA is the average rent paid by non RA-recipients, RB the average rent 
paid by RA-recipients, R the average rent paid in the sample, etc. If the income 
elasticity of housing demand is positive, this is an underestimate because the average 
income of RA-recipients is lower than that of non-recipients. However, if we use a 
similar procedure to estimate the income elasticity of housing demand, we obtain 
f\y = —1.76. This counterintuitive result is a direct consequence of the stronger 
incentives of the RA program for lower income households. 
We can avoid the use of between-regime income variation by a slightly more so-
phisticated analysis in which we regress the rent on price and income. The resulting 
price and income elasticities are ij = —0.27 and ijy = 0.43. 
It must be stressed that these estimates may still be biased. First, the norm 
rent may have an upward effect on the rents paid in the RA regime, resulting in an 
upward bias in the absolute value of the price elasticity. Moreover, its dependence on 
income may induce an upward bias in the estimate of the income elasticity. Second, 
the price may be endogenous, e.g. because RA-recipients may have a relatively 
strong preference for housing services causing an upward bias in the absolute value 
of the price elasticity. Third, we have not distinguished between non-recipients with 
and without entitlement to RA. Fourth, for RA-recipients the appropriate income 
measure is virtual income Yv that includes the fixed costs of RA. The structural 
model of the next section will deal with these potential biases. 
One implication of our theoretical model is that there is a positive relation-
ship between the take-up of the RA-benefits and the amount of the benefit (see 
subsection 3.4). We examine this by estimating a probit 
model, with the dependent variable being 1 if the households exercises its enti-
tlement to RA and 0 otherwise, and with independent variables the amount of RA 
(S) and income (Y). The estimation results and Standard errors aie: 
constant S Y 
-0.30 0.40 -0.00076 (21) 
(0.19) (0.040) (0.0075) 
Only the coëfficiënt of S is significant at a 5% level. We conclude that there is a 
significant positive relation between take-up and the amount of the benefit, as is 
predicted by the model in section 3.4. 
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5 An Empirical Model of Rental Housing De-
mand 
In this section, we first discuss our estimation strategy, that we then use to obtain 
estimates of the parameters of the model. The estimation strategy consists of three 
steps. First, we choose a stochastic specification for the structural model of rental 
housing demand. Next, we note that the structural model can be obtained by re-
stricting the parameters of a reduced form model. We derive the likelihood function 
of this reduced form model. Finally, we obtain the structural form parameters from 
the reduced form parameters by the minimum distance method. This estimation 
procedure is computationally simpler than and asymptotically equivalent to max-
imum likelihood estimation of the structural model. In section 5.2 we present our 
empirical results. 
5.1 Stochastic Specification and Estimation Strategy 
The model of the previous section is not suited to estimation. It assumes that 
every household has the same preference structure, i.e., the same /?. One can model 
variation in preferences by making j3 dependent on demographic characteristics, 
but not all variation can be explained by a few variables. Moreover, we have seen 
in the last section that with respect to demographic variables as household size and 
age of the head, households that receive RA do not differ much from households 
that do not receive RA. Therefore, it is unlikely that the difference in average 
housing demand between RA recipients and other households can be attributed to 
differences in demographic characteristics. We model heterogeneity of preferences 
by making /30 a random variable that varies over the population. The marginal rate 
of substitution between housing services and other goods is —^lf^f+R° = U'R/U'X-
If the Slutsky condition is satisned, the denominator is negative and the marginal 
rate of substitution increases linearly with /?0. Households with a large /?0 strongly 
prefer housing over other goods. 
Let /?Q be normally distributed with mean SQ and variance aj: /30 ~ Sf(60, er?). 
The deviation of /J0 from its mean is denoted by C- K all variation in housing 
demand is due to preference and income variation, the stochastic version of our 
demand model becomes: 
K
-\60+p2(l-6) + p1Yv + <;>Rn 1=1 W> 
r
=(| ( 1-5 ) + | + | ) e X P ( - / ? l ( 1 - 5 ) ) - ( | + | + | ) e X P ( - / ? l ) 
+ expC-^Cl - 6))YV - exp(-/*1)ï r - e x p C - ^ l - 6))C 
+ ^-Ui-s))-~p(-fil)y (23) 
_ ƒ o r < 
~ 11 I* > 
Since rents in the RA-regime (I = 1) necessarily exceed the norm rent Rn, the 
distribution of rents in this regime is truncated from below. In equation (22), and 
later on, this is indicated by ' > Rn' after the demand equation. Note that if 
/?! > 0, then I* is increasing in £, i.e. households with a relatively strong preference 
for housing are more likely to receive RA. 
Of course, it is overly restrictive to allow only for preference heterogeneity. An-
other source of variation in the demand equation is the difference between the real-
ized consumption of housing services and the desired consumption of these services. 
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At the moment of the decision the desired type of dweiling may not be available, 
and the household must settle for a dweiling that either provides a larger or smaller 
amount of housing services. We assume that on average households realize their 
desired level of consumption. Because it may be easier to find a dwelling with the 
desired level of housing services in either the EA- or non-RA regime, the variance 
of this optimization-failure disturbance term need not be equal in both regimes. 
Households that prefer the RA regime face a restriction when choosing a particular 
dwelling. Even if the level of housing services provided by the dwelling is not equal 
to the desired level, it must exceed the level corresponding to the norm rent. We 
assume that households in the RA regime are aware of this restriction, so that the 
rents in the RA regime are truncated at the norm rent. Households that prefer the 
non-RA regime do not face a simiiar restriction, because there is no obligation to 
take up the RA benefits. Note that the truncation in the RA regime only occurs 
if we allow for optimization errors. In (22) the rent in the RA regime necessarily 
exceeds Rn. 
We also allow for additional variation in the regime allocation equation. There 
are two reasons for this. First, it is possible that households do not find a dwelling in 
their preferred regime, because there is no suitable dwelling available. Second, the 
application costs C may vary over the population, and the additional disturbance 
term captures this heterogeneity. We can not distinguish between these two sources 
of variation that are conceptually simiiar anyway. 
The complete stochastic specification of our model is now: 
K
- \ 6 0 + l32(l-6) + l31Yv+<; + v2>Rn 1=1 W 
-hexpH^l - 6))YV - expHJjy - expH^l - 6))C 
ZexpH^l-^-expH?!) 
V A 
0 
+ ( ^V-PIV- ~ y ~ ~vK-ru\ ( + VSJ ( 2 5 ) 
T_(0 I * < 
\ i r > o 
We assume that the preference heterogeneity £ is independent of the optimization 
errors vx, v2 and v3. The variances of these terms will be denoted by o-?, af, a\ and 
<r| respectively. 
If we ignore the parameter restrictions on (24) and (25), the corresponding 
reduced form model is: 
f aQ + aYY + ei 1=0 
K
-{<Xi + <xYYv+e2>Rn 1=1 W 
r=Jo+ryYv+fyY + *i (27) 
_(0 I*<0 
X i r > o 
For future reference, we define RA to be the systematic part of the first equation, 
i.e. RA = a 0 + aYY. RB and I are defined analogously as the systematic parts of 
the second demand equation and the regime allocation equation. 
The distribution of the disturbances is 
e2\ ~ A f l O , ' 
We impose the conventional normalization <r? = 1. 
" i i 
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The identification of the structural parameters from the reduced form parame-
ters proceeds as follows. First, fir is equal to aY or a y . The equality of aY and aY 
is an overidentifying restriction on the demand equations. Secondly, a0 — a1= /32$ 
and hence this difference identifies /?2. Because we have identified /3lt we can identify 
o-? from either cov (ex, rf) or cov (e2, rj). The equality of these covariances is a second 
overidentifying restriction. In the regime allocation equation the ratio of j Y and 
j Y identifies fix. This is a third overidentifying restriction: 
<*r(= - r . ) = \^% ( - ^ ) • (28) 
Because 60, flx and /32 are identified from the demand equations the constant of the 
regime allocation equation just identifies C. Hence, there are three overidentifying 
restrictions. If we set the application costs C to zero, then there is an additional 
overidentifying restriction. Since all parameters in the regime allocation equation 
are identified from the parameters of the demand equations, the variance of rj is 
identified as well. Since <r? is identified, this in turn identifies the variance of v3. 
On the assumption that the regime choice precedes the choice of a dwelling, the 
loglikelihood of this model is given by 
W = £ > S / K - > - Q + $ > g / ( i 2 , . | I^Ri > Rni)W) 
r—n */—oo li=0 
ClJe^Ri-RBi^)dr, 
h P r^« ^R^ % * °) J-* (r))dr) 
= E ( l o S fcARi - RAi) + l o g P r ^ < -ït | ex = R{ - RAi)) 
li=0 ^ ' 
+ E ( l o « fe,(Ri ~ RBi) + 1°SM»? > ~h I *2 = Ri ~ RSi) 
- log Pr (V > -It, e2 > Rni - RBi) + logPr (t, > - £ ) ) . (29) 
Here, ƒ denotes the bivariate density of (e^rj), ƒ the marginal density of ex, 
e t c , and 6 is the vector of identified parameters: 
e' = (a0 aY Ul aYv To T n j Y <7£i„ aE2V <£ <r»a). 
The loglikelihood function does not depend on cov(e1,e2)- Since we only observe 
housing demand in one of the two possible regimes, it is hardly surprising that this 
parameter is not identified. 
The structural model in equation (24) follows from the reduced form model by 
imposing parametric restrictions. Let these restrictions be given by: 
6 = •*($). 
The exact form of the restrictions is given in Appendix B. We estimate the structural 
parameters ip by the minimum distance method (see, for instance, Chamberlain 
(1984)). An estimate of ij) is obtained by minimizing the quadratic form 
sN = (ê - *W)'AN (é - *w), (30) 
14 
with AN a possibly stochastic weighting matrix and 6 the maximum likelihood 
estimator of 6. Under certain regularity conditions, the asymptotic distribution of 
ip is 
y/N(S> -$)~M (o, (F'AF^F'A (var I?) AF{F'AF)-i) 
where A = plimAjy and F = *dY? • It is easily seen that choosing the weighting 
matrix AN = (var0J yields the estimator for ip with the smallest variance. 
However, the minimand of (30) is a consistent estimator for ij>, regardless of the 
choice of AN, If the restrictions are true, then minimum distance estimation with 
weighting matrix (varfl)" yields an estimator which has the same asymptotic 
distribution as the maximum likelihood estimator. 
If the structural model is just identified, V>() will be one-to-one and the mini-
mum of the quadratic form (30) is 0. On the other hand, if the structural model is 
overidentifled, then SN can be used to test these restrictions. To be precise, under 
the null hypothesis that the restrictions are satisfied, we have that SN a~y x2(p), 
with p the number of overidentifying restrictions. 
5.2 Empirical Results 
The estimation results for the reduced form model in equations (26) and (27) 
are given in table 2. All calculations were performed using the MAXLIK- and 
OPTMÜM-routines of GAUSS386VM on a 486-personal computer. 
Parameter Parameter 
a
o 2.26 '«m 0.16 (0.27) (0.15) 
aY 0.089 ^ s i ) 0.37 (0.0088) (0.25) 
a i 4.11 ' t l 1.37 (0.26) (0.030) 
aY, 0.058 «** 1.28 
(0.011) (0.051) 
7o 1.12 
(0.13) 
tr. 0.75 
(0.054) 
JY -0.71 (0.047) 
HQ -3973.52 
Observations 1809 
Table 2: Estimation results, reduced form model (standard errors in parentheses) 
The empirical results of the reduced form are in accordance with our expecta-
tions: the income effect is positive and significantly so in both demand equations. 
The price effect is negative, as can be seen from the difference between the inter-
cepts. The estimates of j Y and j Y have an opposite sign, as in the regime allocation 
equation (25). Moreover, j Y is slightly larger in absolute value than j Y , which was 
expected from the theoretical model as well. The covariances between the distur-
bance of the regime allocation equation and those of the demand equations are small 
and positive, though not significantly different from 0. The implied correlations are 
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pCiT) — 0.14 and ptit) = 0.33. Two restrictions implied by the structural model can 
be imposed on the reduced form directly, viz. aY = ocY and cov {ex, rj) = cov (e2, rj). 
The resulting reduced form estimates are very similar to the ones reported in table 2 
and the restrictions are not rejected as is seen from the likelihood-ratio test statistic 
{LR = 4.70, x*.95(2) = 5.99). 
Parameter Application No application 
costs costs 
*o 
Pi 
c 
*< 
4.08 3.89 
(0.13) (0.13) 
0.079 0.065 
(0.0063) (0.0069) 
-1.50 -0.83 
(0.23) (0.23) 
1.03 -
(0.050) 
0.59 0.88 
(0.12) (0.085) 
1.24 1.09 
(0.061) (0.070) 
1.11 1.03 
(0.068) (0.075) 
1.23 4.15 
(0.087) (0.55) 
SN 4.74 265.95 
Overidentifying 
restrictions 
Table 3: Estimation results, structural model (standard errors in parentheses) 
The parameter estimates for the structural model, obtained by minimum dis-
tance estimation, are given in table 3. The weighting matrix used is .A^ = (var#J 
We give estimates of the structural model both with and without application 
costs. If we estimate the structural model with C = 0 then the restrictions are 
rejected (SN = 265.95, Xo.95(4) = 9.47). Allowing for application costs yields larger 
estimates for the price and income effects and the remaining restrictions on the 
reduced form are not rejected (SN — 4 . 7 4 , X Q 9 5 ( 3 ) = 7.81). The reason that the 
restrictions for the structural model without application costs are rejected is that 
the overidentifying restriction on the intercept of the regime allocation equation 
is rejected. As indicated above, no problems arise from the restrictions aY = aY 
and cov (st,rjj) — cov (e2, rj). Moreover, note that the estimate for the income effect 
based on 7 ^ and 7 (see equation (28)) is 0.067, which is neatly between aY and 
&Y . Hence, the rejection of the restrictions is caused by rejection of the restriction 
on 70 and hence, by the restriction that there are no application costs (C = 0). 
The implied price elasticity evaluated at the average rent and price (R = 4.84 
and p = 0.68) equals —0.21 and the income elasticity evaluated at R = 4.84 and 
Y = 22.93 is 0.37. These estimates are both somewhat smaller in absolute value 
than the crude estimates obtained in section 4.2 but the differences are remarkably 
small. This can be partly explained by the small estimates of aeiV and <r£2r), since 
these imply that the biases due to self-selection are small. 
The application costs C are large and significantly positive, as was expected. The 
estimated costs are Dfl. 1031, which is 18% of the average rent paid by RA-recipients 
and 51% of the average RA subsidy received. The estimates imply that 18% of the 
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residual variance in the non-RA regime and 22% in the RA regime is explained by 
preference variation13. We now turn to some implications of the estimates of the 
structural model. 
6 Implication of the Estimates 
In this section we use the structural model to 
1. Decompose the difference in average rent paid by RA and non-RA recipients 
observed in table 1. 
2. Study housing consumption in the absence of RA. 
3. Examine the effect of application costs. 
Rents in counterfactual situations refer to utility-maximizing levels of housing con-
sumption. On the assumption that the policies of the Dutch government are aimed 
at the satisfaction of demand at a fixed unit price of housing services, we can con-
sider the outcomes as long-run equilibria. 
The calculations in this section refer to typical households, which represent sub-
groups in the population. These subgroups are identified by their regime choice, and 
for the exogenous variables we take the average values in the chosen regime. For ex-
ample, RA-recipients are identified by I — 1 and have Y = 20.83, Yv = 18.02. Hence, 
we may calculate the probability that a household with these average values of the 
income variables chooses a dwelling that entitles it to RA, and the corresponding 
expected utility maximizing rent. Below the subscript A indicates non-RA recipi-
ents, the subscript B indicates RA recipients and Y and Yv indicate the income and 
virtual income in the regime allocation equation. 
6.1 Decomposition of the Difference 
We first decompose the difference between the rents paid by a representative house-
hold which receives RA and a representative household which does not. These house-
holds differ in a number of ways. First, the RA household pays a lower price for 
housing services, but it also has a lower income due to the imphcit entry fee. More-
over, an RA household is restricted in its choice to rents that exceed the norm 
rent Rn. These three differences reflect the incentives of the RA program. Second, 
as noted in table 1 the income of RA households is lower than that of non-RA 
households. Third, RA households have a stronger preference for housing services 
than non-RA households. We decompose the difference of the expected (utility-
maximizing) rents between the two representative households which is equal to 
Dn. 163014, into a program effect, that consists of three parts, an income effect and 
a preference heterogeneity effect. The results are reported in table 4. 
6.2 Housing Consumption in the Absence of RA 
The effect of the elimination of RA on a representative RA household is equal to the 
sum of the three program effects reported in table 4. Housing consumption would be 
13In section 3.4 we introduced application costs to explain the partial take-up of RA-benefits. 
Stiictly speaking applicationcosts affect the demandfor housing services in the RA regime, becatise 
they reduce the virtual income of the household. As a consequence the constant of the demand 
equation in the RA regime is 5o — Pi C + fe (1 — S). Hence, the estimate of the price effect reported 
in table 3 may be too small in absolute value. Because ftC is very small, the potential bias is 
negligible. 
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 This difference is larger than that reported in table 1. This is due to the non-linearity of the 
model. To obtain the difference of table 1 we have to simulate over the sample. 
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Price effect 630 
E(RB\p=l-6,Y = YVB,RB >Rn,I=l,Y = YBX = YvB) 5780 
-E(RB\P = 1,Y = YVB,RB > Rn,I=l,Y = YB,YV = YvB) -5150 
Entry fee -90 
E(RB \p=l,Y = YVB,RB> RnJ=hY = YB,YV=YVB) 5150 
-E (RB IP = 1, Y = YB,RB > Rn,I = 1, Y = YB, Y„ = Y„B) -5240 
Truncation effect 800 
E (RB I P = i , y = ? * , % > £ „ , / = i , y = y B , y . = *;*) 5240 
-E(RB\p = l,Y = YBtI=l,Y = YB,YV = y, f l) -4440 
Incorne difference —3900 
£ (RB Ip = l , y = YB,I = l , y = YB,YV = YvB) 4440 
- j? (RB ip = i , y = YA,i = i , y = YAX = n A ) -4830 
Preference heterogeneity 680 
E(RB\P = I,Y = YA,I = i , y = yA >y. = y , x ) 4830 
-E(RA\P=I,Y = YA,I=O,Y = y A ,y . = YVA) -4 iso 
Total difference 1630 
E(RB\p = l-6,Y = YvB,RB>Rn,I=l,Y = YBX=YvB) 5780 
-E(RA\P=1,Y = YVA,Y = YA,YV=YVA) -4150 
Table 4: Decomposition of rent difference 
Probability of using RA, Pr ( l = 1 | C, Y, Y„) 0.35 
Expected rent 4660 
Probability of RA, no application costs (C = 0) 0.66 
Expected rent 5020 
Probability of RA, no application costs (<r| = 0) 0.87 
Expected rent 5180 
Table 5: Probability of taking up RA for an average household in the sample, and 
the expected utility maximizing rent 
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Probability of RA, Pr ( l = 1 j C, Y, Y„, RA > Rn) 0.44 
Probability of RA, no application costs (C = 0) 0.74 
Probability of RA, no application costs {<r\ = 0) 0.97 
Table 6: Probability of taking up RA for a household with income equal to the 
average income of households which do not take up their benefit 
reduced by Dfl. 1340 (23%). The fraction of income spent on housing would change 
from 25.3% to 21.3%. 
6.3 The Effect of Application Costs 
In section 3 we discussed the effects of application costs on housing demand. Armed 
with the estimates of our structural model, we are able to quantify the effect of 
application costs. In table 5 we consider the average household in our sample, i.e., 
the household with average values of Y and Yv. We find the effect of application 
costs by setting C = 0. If we interpret v3 as unobserved heterogeneity in C, then 
elimination of application costs would also imply v3 = 0. Hence, in table 5 we also 
compute the probability of taking up RA if c j = 0. In that table, we also give the 
expected rent 
E(R) = E (RA 11 = 0) P r ( I = 0) + E(RB \RB>Rn,I= 1) P r ( I = 1). 
In table 6 we concentrate on households with rents that entitle them to RA. 
If application costs were eliminated, almost all these households would use their 
entitlement. 
7 Summary and Conclusions 
We have developed and estimated a structural model of rental housing demand, 
and we have used this model to study the impact of a rent subsidy program on 
the demand for rental housing. Recently, the credibility of structural estimates of 
program effects has been questioned. Some researchers have taken the position that 
only (quasi-) experimental approaches can yield valid estimates of eifects. Although 
this discussion has focused correctly on the weak points of structural methods, it 
is our opinion that the structural approach, if applied carefully, can yield valuable 
insights into the working of social programs. 
For that reason we have chosen not to impose the restrictions implied by our 
structural model. Instead, we have tested these restrictions against a reduced form, 
and we have concluded that the restrictions are not rejected by the data. The only 
assumptions we have not tested are the distributional assumptions with respect 
to the parameter heterogeneity and the disturbances in the demand and regime 
allocation equations. However, before we test these it is important to study the 
identifiability of these distributions. The problem is somewhat similar to the identi-
fication problem in the Roy model that has been studied recently by Heekman and 
Honoré (1990). We leave this to future work. 
In section 6 we have shown that the structural model allows us to study a variety 
of interesting questions related to the Rent Assistance program. In that section we 
have only taken a first step. An open question, which has not been answered, is 
how effective RA is in stimulating housing consumption or as an income support 
program, both stated goals of the program. 
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A Select ion of Households 
In the empirical analysis, we did not use all cases of the Housing Needs Survey 
1985/86. The cases used satisfied the following criteria: 
1. the household is the mam occupant of the dwelling; 
2. the dweiling is not used for business purposes (not a farm, shop, etc.) 
3. the respondent is reasonably satisfied with the dweiling and the neighbour-
hood; 
4. the household has no intentions of moving within the next two years; 
5. the household is a single person household or a couple with or without with 
children; 
6. the head of the household is not self-employed; 
7. the household occupies a rental dweiling; 
8. the income data of the household are valid as checked by the Central Bureau 
of Statistics; 
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9. taxable income of the household in 1984 exceeds Dfl. 10000; 
10. rent in 1985 exceeds Dfl. 1200; 
11. the household has moved in the period 1982-1986; 
12. on the basis of its income the household is eligible for RA; 
13. rent paid is less than the maximum rent; 
14. the household does not receive RA while our simulation program indicates 
that the household is not entitled to RA; 
15. the respondent is either the head of the household or his/her partner; 
16. households taxable income in 1984 was below Dfl. 31000 for households with 
one member or Dfl. 35000 for households with two or more members. 
B Restrictions Implied by the Structural Model 
Let 0 be the vector of parameters of the reduced form model and ij> be the vector 
of parameters of the structural model: 
6 = (a0 aY <*! a n T o T n j Y <rtir> a£an txCi <rcJ 
i> = (6o Pi P2 c °c ° i °*2 **)' 
The relations between the reduced form parameters and the structural parameters 
are given by: 
<x0 = 60 + p 2 (B-l) 
«y = Pi (B-2) 
ai = 60 + p2(l-6) (B-3) 
<*y„=/?i (B-4) 
7 0 = ( ( | ( 1 - 6 ) + l + | ) e X P ( - / ? l ( 1 - ' ) ) 
- ( | +1 +1) «p(-ft) - «PH^I - *))c) I 
2 ,^e3cp(-/?1(l - 6) - exp(-/?x) 
.ry „1V .„v ^ + (B_5) 
= expR^!-*)) 
=
 e X P ( ~ ^ l )
 ( B T ) 
Y
 ^ ^M-^l-S)-eM-fil)y + ^ 
<r >*? + *? (B-8) 
< = *? + <i (B-9) 
_ ^2 ^ e x p C - ^ a - ^ - e x p C - / ? ! ) ^ 
,.„ = <* ^pc-^d-y-expc-^)^
 ( B n ) 
*. . ,=*?{ ^ "U «" "V " i ; l (^0) 
v * 
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G Details of t he Loglikelihood 
The demand model in section 5 is 
l t i
- \ a 1 + a'z2i + s2i>Rni It = l W 
i ? = y * * + ifc (C-2) 
'' ~ \ 1 % > 0 
where the vector zxi contains the regressors of the demand equationfor non-recipients, 
etc. The coefficients of the regressors are stacked in the vector a. As discussed in 
the text, we imposed the condition that the coefficients of the regressors are equal 
between both demand equations. 
The vector (eu e2i »?,•)' is normally distributed: 
«al ~JV|0, 
The loglikelihood is now given by: 
m = E (lo« fa(Ri - ÈM) + iogi*fo < -ii I «i = Ri - RJU)) 
li=0 
+ E (lo« f*SRi - RBi) + logPrfr > ~ïi I H = -R,- - &Bi) 
-logPt(RBi + e2> Rni, r, > -ï.) + logPr(»? > -ï{)) 
= E (los h (^ - ^ / ' i ) + l o s # '"* ~ ^ " RM) V W 
i i = l ^ 2 
+l0
^( vw* j 
- log (1 - (<J>((i2ni - ËBi)/<r2) + *(-£.) 
- * 2 ((**,- " * « ) / * » " ^ /»))) + log (*(ïi))) • (C-3) 
Here, <f>(-) denotes, the Standard normal density function, $(•) the Standard normal 
distribution function and $2(-,•;/?) is the bivariate Standard normal distribution 
function with correlation parameter p. 
D Conditional Expectations 
The conditional expectations in both demand regimes are given by: 
E(RA\r)<-ï) = RA + E(e1\r,<-I)=RA-(rsv^ (D-l) 
E (RB | V > -ï,e2 >Rn-RB)=RB+E(e2\r,> -ï,e2 >Rn- RB) 
<f>(ëjkï£a) ( (-Ï-P R«-Rj} 
'Prfo > -I,e2>Rn- RB) \ \ ^ ~ 2 
e?V 
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^ ">T>r{T,>-I,e2>Rn-RB) ^ ^ ^ W ^ * 
B 3Pï(iï>-i,e2>^-5B) ^ y w ï ^ 
(see Pudney (1989), Appendix 2, equation (A2.57)). Of course, the last equation 
contains two correction terms, the first reflects the truncation RB > Rn and the 
second reflects the endogeneity of the regime. 
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